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a b s t r a c t 
Subset sum problem is a classical NP-hard problem viewed as a candidate to design 
quantum-resistant cryptography. Cryptographic constructions based on extended modular 
subset sum problems are proposed subsequently in recent years. In this paper, we propose 
an improved broadcast attack against subset sum problems via lattice oracle. We reduce 
multi-dimensional (modular) subset sum problems to BDD oracle and present an explicit 
relationship among parameters. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first analysis on 
the trade-off between the efficiency of broadcast attacks and the number of obtained ci- 
phertexts on subset sum problems. We implement our broadcast attack using LLL and BKZ 
algorithm and show experimentally that our method is quite practical. Furthermore, our al- 
gorithm is applicable to those low-weight subset sum problems which some cryptographic 
schemes are based on. We claim that our attack is efficient for both binary encoding and 
powerline encoding under certain parameter settings. 
© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Subset sum problem is a classical NP-hard problem and has been considered as an alternative to factoring and discrete
logarithm problem to design public key cryptosystems. The subset sum problem, also known as knapsack problem, is defined
as: given a set of positive integers { a 1 , , a n } and a target sum s , find a subset of a i ’s that exactly sum up to s . If we write
a = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) , the subset sum problem asks to find x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } n such that 
a 1 x 1 + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a n x n = s. 
The appealing of subset sum problem to cryptographers depends on its two outstanding features. On one hand, comput-
ing the subset sum function can be done within a few addition operations, which is quite efficient. On the other, there is no
known polynomial time quantum algorithm that can break subset sum problem, which is distinguished from factoring and
discrete logarithm [34] . 
Merkle and Hellman proposed the first instantiated public key cryptosystem based on subset sum problem in 1978 [22] .
Since then, an army of public key encryption schemes based on subset sum problem have been proposed. The pity is that
most of these proposals have been broken subsequently. They are mainly subject to two classes of attacks. One class heavily∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: y-y13@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn (Y. Yu), xiaody12@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn (D. Xiao). 
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 relies on the specific structure of the proposed trapdoor, such as Shamir’s polynomial attack on Merkle–Hellman system
[33] and Brickell’s attack on multi-iterated Merkle–Hellman scheme [7] . The other class deals with generic knapsacks with
large weight via lattice algorithms, which is also known as low-density attack [1,6,12,17,18] . 
In order to avoid low-density attack, some schemes selected low-weight knapsacks in their encryption [11,26] where
the Hamming weight of the plaintext is fixed. It can be generalized to powerline encoding where the plaintext is a vector
belonging to N n with fixed coordinate sum. 
Besides, there are still some cryptographic constructions based on subset sum problems remaining secure today includ-
ing the universal one-way hash functions, pseudorandom generators and bit-commitment schemes [16] . Moreover, a prov-
ably secure scheme based on modular subset sum problem was proposed by Ajtai and Dwork [4] . Since then, lattice-based
cryptosystems with the worst-case hardness were developed in succession [20,28,31,32] . In some sense, their underlying
problems can be viewed as extended subset sum problems. 
Broadcast attack is a classical technique, proposed by Håstad in 1988, to analyze public key cryptosystems. It is applied
in the scenario where a sender encrypts a single message by different public keys of multiple recipients. This attack enables
an attacker to recover the message from the ciphertexts without any knowledge of these recipients’ secret keys. Usually, the
efficiency of broadcast attack is related to the number of ciphertexts which are referred to as challenges . 
1.1. Related work 
The hardness of a single subset sum problem can be reduced to either a CVP problem of the orthogonal lattice with
a constructed target vector [25] , or an SVP oracle of the embedded lattice for density < 0.9408 [12] . Plantard and Susilo
constructed a broadcast attack against knapsack problems exploiting lattice intersections to enlarge the parameter of uSVP
[29] . A broadcast attack via SVP oracle was proposed in [27] later. However, both works do not present relations between
the power of oracle and the number of required challenges. Lattice algorithms for single low-weight subset sum problems
were discussed in [25] . We will explore further on those low-weight knapsack problems with multiple challenges. 
1.2. Our contribution 
In this paper, we construct a broadcast attack on subset sum problems via BDD (or uSVP) oracle. By an improved analysis
of the orthogonal lattice, we give an explicit relationship between the parameter γ in BDD 1/ γ oracle and the number of
required challenges, which are two crucial factors impacting on the efficiency of broadcast attacks. Our work will lead to
a better understanding of subset sum problems, and can be used to quantify the security of relevant cryptosystems more
precisely. 
Moreover, we implemented our attack using LLL and BKZ algorithm and show experimentally that our method is practical
because it suffices to recover the solution from only a small number of challenges. We also apply our attack to low-weight
subset sum problems used in Okamoto–Tanaka–Uchiyama scheme [26] , and claim that our attack is efficient for certain
parameters. 
We note that our result on modular subset sum problem will help to explore secure parameter setting for modular
knapsack based cryptography theoretically, especially for those vectorial modular subset sum problems such as SIS (Small
Integer Solution) problem [2,15] . 
1.3. Roadmap 
We start in Section 2 with some notations and basic facts. In Section 3 , we report on our reduction from multi-
dimensional subset sum problem to BDD and apply our method to low-weight subset sum problem in Section 4 . We discuss
modular subset sum problem in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6 . 
2. Preliminary 
We denote by ‖ · ‖ the Euclidean norm and 〈 · , · 〉 the inner product in R n . Let 1 n be the vector in R n with entries all 1’s.
For a finite set E , we denote by U ( E ) the uniform distribution over E . Let [ B ] = N ∩ [0 , B ] for B > 0. We write vectors of R n in
the form of columns. 
Definition 1 (Lattice) . Given m linearly independent vectors b 1 , · · · , b m ∈ R n , the lattice generated by the b i ’s is L ={∑ m 
i =1 x i b i | x i ∈ Z 
}
. 
We refer to B = (b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b m ) as a basis of the lattice L . We say that the rank of the lattice is m and the dimension is
n . If n = m, the lattice is called a full-rank lattice . 
Definition 2 (Determinant) . Given a lattice L and its basis B , the determinant of L is defined as det L = 
√ 
det (B T B ) , which
equals the volume of the fundamental parallelepiped P(B ) = 
{∑ n 
i =1 c i b i | c i ∈ [0 , 1) 
}
, denote d by vol ( L ) . 
We denote by B n (r) and S n −1 (r) the n -dimensional ball and sphere of radius r centered at the origin respectively. 
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 Definition 3 (Successive Minima) . Let L be a lattice of rank n . For i ∈ [ n ] {0}, we define the i th successive minimum as the
radius of the smallest sphere containing at least i linearly independent lattice vectors, i.e. 
λi (L ) = inf { r | dim (span (L ∩ B n (r))) ≥ i } . 
Definition 4 (Dual Lattice) . For a lattice L , we define its dual lattice L ∗ = { y ∈ span (L ) | ∀ x ∈ L , 〈 x , y 〉 ∈ Z } . 
We now recall two most basic computational problems involving lattices, SVP and CVP. Both SVP and CVP are NP-hard
problems [3,35] . 
Definition 5 (SVP) . Given a lattice L , the shortest vector problem(SVP) is to find v ∈ L such that ‖ v ‖ = λ1 (L ) . 
Definition 6 (CVP) . Given a lattice L and target vector t , the closest vector problem(CVP) is to find v ∈ L such that ‖ v − t ‖ ≤
‖ u − t ‖ for arbitrary u ∈ L . 
We usually use dist (t , L ) to represent the closest distance from t to L . That is dist (t , L ) = inf {‖ v − t ‖ | v ∈ L} . 
There are lattice attacks known as low-density attacks on generic subset sum problems. In the whole paper, we denote
by log the logarithm function with base 2 and d the density of the subset sum problem, i.e. d = n 
log B 
. 
Lemma 2.1. Let B be a positive integer, and a 1 , a 2 , , a n be uniformly random integers in [1, B ] . Let e = (e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } n
be arbitrary, and s = ∑ n i =1 a i e i . If the density d < 0 . 9408 . . . , then the subset sum problem defined by ( a 1 , a 2 , , a n ; s ) can be
solved in polynomial time with a single call to an SVP oracle. Furthermore, the subset sum problem of ( a 1 , a 2 , , a n ; s ) can be
solved with a single call to a CVP oracle independently of the density. 
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 in [12] and Lemma 2 in [25] , we complete the proof directly. 
Definition 7 (BDD 1/ γ ) . Given a lattice L and target vector t , where λ1 (L ) ≥ γ · dist (t , L ) , the 1/ γ -bounded distance
decoding(BDD 1/ γ ) is to find a vector v ∈ L such that ‖ v − t ‖ = dist (t , L ) . 
Definition 8 (uSVP γ ). Given a lattice L such that λ2 (L ) > γ λ1 (L ) , the γ -unique SVP (uSVP γ ) is to find the shortest non-
zero vector in L . 
We have the following reductions between BDD 1/ γ and uSVP [5,19] : 
uSVP γ ≤ BDD 1 /γ ≤ uSVP γ (1+ ε) / √ 2 , 
where ε = (1 /n ) . As γ increases, the BDD 1/ γ (or uSVP γ ) instance becomes easier, which implies a lower requirement for
the algorithm to solve it. 
The most popular tool to estimate the number of lattice points in a set is the so-called Gaussian Heuristic [10,14] . 
Gaussian Heuristic . Given a lattice L and a “nice” set S , the number of points in S ∩ L is ≈ vol (S) / vol (L ) . 
We denote by N B (n, r) the number of integer points in B n (r) . From Gaussian Heuristic, we have that N B (n, r) is propor-
tional to r n for large radius r and the hidden constant coefficient is π
n/ 2 
(n/ 2+1) . 
3. Broadcast attack against subset sum problem 
In this section, we are to expound our broadcast attack against subset sum problem by reducing multi-dimensional subset
sum problem to BDD and show the efficiency experimentally. 
Given k challenges, all we need is to recover the solution e = (e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } n , ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
a 1 , 1 e 1 + a 1 , 2 e 2 + · · · + a 1 ,n e n = s 1 
a 2 , 1 e 1 + a 2 , 2 e 2 + · · · + a 2 ,n e n = s 2 
· · ·
a k, 1 e 1 + a k, 2 e 2 + · · · + a k,n e n = s k 
where a i, j ’s are uniformly chosen in [ B ] for i ∈ [ k ] {0}, j ∈ [ n ] {0}. 
Let A = (a i, j ) be the coefficient matrix, which is a uniformly random matrix of [ B ] k ×n , and s = (s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n ) ∈ Z n . We
are interested in the case where 2 log 
2 n ≤ B ≤ 2 2 n since the subset sum problem is easy to solve when B is extremely large
(see Lemma 2.1 ) or small [9] . 
3.1. Improved reduction from multi-dimensional subset sum problems to lattice problems 
It stands to reason that the larger k is, the easier to recover e is. Especially when k ≈n , one can figure out e simply by
solving these linear equations. Without loss of generality, we make an assumption that k ≤n /3, which is the fault tolerance
of consensus protocol in distributed systems [8] . 
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 Now we define the orthogonal lattice and target vector that will be used later. We denote by A ⊥ the lattice 
A ⊥ = { x ∈ Z n | Ax = 0 } 
and y ∈ Z n an arbitrary solution to Ax = s . We set the target point t as 
t = −y + 1 
2 
1 n . 
By running BDD 1/ γ oracle with input ( A 
⊥ , t ), we can recover e with overwhelming probability. The following result is our
main conclusion. 
Theorem 3.1 (Main Theorem) . Let A be uniformly distributed over [ B ] k ×n for log 2 n ≤ log B ≤2 n. There exists an algorithm to
find a solution to Ax = s for x ∈ {0, 1} n with overwhelming probability via a single call to BDD 1/2 oracle when k ≥3 d, where
d = n/ log B is the density. 
In particular, when 1 2 d log n + 1 ≤ k ≤ n 3 , one can find a solution to Ax = s for x ∈ {0, 1} n with overwhelming probability via
a single call to BDD 1/ γ oracle with 
1 ≤ log γ ≤ n 
n − k 
(
k − 1 
d 
− 1 
2 
log n 
)
+ 1 . 
With the reduction from BDD 1/ γ to uSVP γ / 
√ 
2 
, we can obtain the following corollary directly. 
Corollary 3.2. There exists an algorithm to find a solution to Ax = s for x ∈ {0, 1} n with overwhelming probability via a polyno-
mial number of calls to uSVP γ oracle with 
1 
2 
< log γ ≤ n 
n − k 
(
k − 1 
d 
− 1 
2 
log n 
)
+ 1 
2 
where d = n 
log B 
is the density and A is uniformly distributed over [ B ] k ×n for log 2 n ≤ log B ≤2 n and 1 2 d log n + 1 ≤ k ≤ n 3 . 
Before we prove our main result Theorem 3.1 , it is necessary to explore the random lattice A ⊥ . Over the randomness
of A , the probability of an arbitrary z ∈ Z n belonging to A ⊥ is quite crucial in the reduction later. Since the rows of A are
independent and identically distributed, we have 
Pr [ x ∈ A ⊥ ] = 
∏ 
i 
Pr [ x ∈ a ⊥ i ] = ( Pr [ x ∈ a ⊥ ]) k . 
Recall the single subset sum problem: 
a 1 e 1 + a 2 e 2 + · · · + a n e n = s 
where a i ∼U ([ B ]) for integer log 2 n ≤ log B < 2 n, e i ∈ {0, 1}. Let a = (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n ) and e = (e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n ) . 
In the analysis of [12] , the probability Pr [ z ∈ a ⊥ ] for arbitrary z ∈ Z n has already been bounded as follows. 
Lemma 3.3 ( [12] ) . Given arbitrary z ∈ Z n \ { 0 } and a ∼U ([ B ]) n , the probability that z ∈ a ⊥ is 
Pr [ z ∈ a ⊥ ] ≤ 1 
B 
. 
We claim that this bound 1 B can be optimized. 
Lemma 3.4. Given z = (z 1 , · · · , z n ) ∈ Z n \ { 0 } and a ∼U ([ B ]) n where n 2 ‖ z ‖ ≤B, we have that 
Pr [ z ∈ a ⊥ ] ≤ ce 
1 
n 
B ‖ z ‖ ∞ ≤
c 
√ 
n e 
1 
n 
B ‖ z ‖ , 
where c = gcd (z 1 , · · · , z n ) and ‖ z ‖ ∞ = max i {| z i |} for i ∈ [ n ] {0} . 
Proof. Let z ′ 
i 
= z i /c for any i ∈ [ n ] {0}, and z ′ = (z ′ 1 , · · · , z ′ n ) , then we get that Pr [ z ∈ a ⊥ ] = Pr [ z ′ ∈ a ⊥ ] . W.l.o.g., we let z ′ 1 =‖ z ‖ ∞ /c, and obtain 
Pr 
[
z ′ ∈ a ⊥ 
]
= Pr 
[ 
a 1 z 
′ 
1 + 
n ∑ 
i =2 
a i z 
′ 
i = 0 
] 
= 
B ∑ 
j=0 
Pr [ a 1 = j] Pr 
[ 
n ∑ 
i =2 
a i z 
′ 
i = −z ′ 1 j 
] 
≤ 1 
B + 1 Pr 
[ 
n ∑ 
i =2 
a i z 
′ 
i = 0 mod z ′ 1 
] 
. 
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 It suffices to prove that 
Pr 
[ 
n ∑ 
i =2 
a i z 
′ 
i = 0 mod z ′ 1 
] 
≤ 1 
z ′ 
1 
e 
1 
n . 
Now we prove the above inequality. Let α(x ) = exp (2 πx √ −1 /z ′ 1 ) , then 
1 
z ′ 
1 
z ′ 1 −1 ∑ 
λ=0 
α(λx ) = 
{
1 x = 0 mod z ′ 1 
0 x  = 0 mod z ′ 1 
. (1) 
Let z ′′ = (z ′ 
2 
, · · · , z ′ n ) and N z ′′ (z ′ 1 ) be the number of vectors x ∈ [ B ] n −1 such that 〈 z ′′ , x 〉 = 0 mod z ′ 1 . Accordingly, we may
obtain that 
N z ′′ (z 
′ 
1 ) = 
1 
z ′ 
1 
∑ 
x ∈ [ B ] n −1 
z ′ 1 −1 ∑ 
λ=0 
α(λ〈 z ′′ , x 〉 ) (2) 
Assuming that B = r 1 z ′ 1 + r 2 with r 2 ∈ [0 , z ′ 1 ) , then we have that for arbitrary x ′ ∈ Z n −1 z ′ 
1 
, the number of vectors x ∈ [ B ] n −1
satisfying x ≡ x ′ mod z ′ 1 is at most (r 1 + 1) n −1 . Therefore, we have 
N z ′′ (z 
′ 
1 ) ≤
(r 1 + 1) n −1 
z ′ 
1 
z ′ 1 −1 ∑ 
λ=0 
∑ 
x ′ ∈ Z n −1 
z ′ 
1 
α(λ〈 z ′′ , x ′ 〉 ) 
= (r 1 + 1) 
n −1 
z ′ 
1 
z ′ 1 −1 ∑ 
λ=0 
n −1 ∏ 
j=1 
⎛ 
⎝ z ′ 1 −1 ∑ 
x ′ 
j 
=0 
α(λx ′ j z ′ j+1 ) 
⎞ 
⎠ . 
From Eq. (1) , the term 
∏ n −1 
j=1 
(∑ z ′ 
1 
−1 
x ′ 
j 
=0 α(λx 
′ 
j 
z ′ 
j+1 ) big) does not equal 0 if and only if λz 
′ 
j+1 = 0 mod z ′ 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 . Due
to the fact that gcd (z ′ 
1 
, · · · , z ′ n ) = 1 , it can be verified that 
∏ n −1 
j=1 
(∑ z ′ 
1 
−1 
x ′ 
j 
=0 α(λx 
′ 
j 
z ′ 
j+1 ) 
)
does not equal 0 if and only if λ = 0 .
Consequently, we get that 
N z ′′ (z 
′ 
1 ) ≤
(r 1 + 1) n −1 (z ′ 1 ) n −1 
z ′ 
1 
. 
Therefore, we have that 
Pr 
[ 
n ∑ 
i =2 
a i z 
′ 
i = 0 mod z ′ 1 
] 
= N z ′′ (z 
′ 
1 ) 
B n −1 
≤ 1 
z ′ 
1 
(
1 + z 
′ 
1 
B 
)n −1 
≤ e 
1 
n 
z ′ 
1 
Due to the fact that ‖ z ‖ ∞ ≥ ‖ z ‖ √ n , we now complete the proof. 
Thanks to the independence among the rows of A , we immediately obtain the following result. 
Lemma 3.5. Given z = (z 1 , · · · , z n ) ∈ Z n \ { 0 } and A ∼U ([ B ]) k ×n where k ≤n and n 2 ‖ z ‖ ≤B, we have that 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ ] ≤
(
ce 
1 
n 
B ‖ z ‖ ∞ 
)k 
≤ 3 
(
c 
√ 
n 
B ‖ z ‖ 
)k 
. 
where ‖ z ‖ ∞ = max i {| z i |} and c = gcd (z 1 , · · · , z n ) for i ∈ [ n ] {0} . 
Before proving Theorem 3.1 , we need to review a classical problem in number theory. Let r n ( t ) denote the number of
representations of non-negative integer t as a sum of n squares, counting permutations and sign changes. Actually r n ( t )
equals the number of integer points on S n −1 ( 
√ 
t ) . The general formula of r n ( t ) for even n was stated by Ramanujan [30] ,
and proved by Mordell [23] . We will give an upper bound of r n ( t ). 
Lemma 3.6. Let r n ( t ) denote the number of integer solutions to 
∑ n 
i =1 x 
2 
i 
= t for non-negative integer t. When n ≥6, we have the
following inequality for r n ( t ) 
r n (t) ≤ Ct n 2 −1 . 
where C is a positive constant. 
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 Proof. When n is even, with the results in [30] , we have r n (t) = δn (t) + e n (t) , where δn ( t ) is the divisor function and e n ( t )
is the error. It was claimed that δn (t) = C ′ t 
n 
2 
−1 for some positive constant C ′ and e n (t) = O 
(
t 
n 
2 
−1 − 1 
2 
[
n 
3 
]
+ 
)
for those n ≥6. As
a result, we obtain an upper bound of r n ( t ) for even n : r n (t) ≤ (C ′ + 1) t 
n 
2 
−1 . 
Now we discuss the case where n is odd. We consider the solution to x 2 
1 
+ ∑ n i =2 x 2 i = t . Taking x 1 = 0 , ±1 , · · · , ± √ t  , we
obtain that 
r n (t) ≤ 2 
 √ t  ∑ 
i =0 
r n −1 (t − i 2 ) ≤ 2(C ′ + 1) 
√ 
t · t n −1 2 −1 = Ct n 2 −1 . 
where C = 2(C ′ + 1) . 
Remark 1. By Gaussian Heuristic, we may evaluate r n ( t ) for t > n 
2 by 
V (B n ( 
√ 
t )) −V (B n ( 
√ 
t − 1 )) = nπ
n 
2 
( n 
2 
+ 1) t 
n 
2 −1 
(
1 + o 
(
1 √ 
t 
))
. 
The estimation of r n ( t ) coincides with that by Gaussian Heuristic for large t . The item 
nπ
n 
2 
( n 
2 
+1) ≤ 1 for large dimension n .
Especially when n is even, the bound Ct 
n 
2 
−1 is somewhat explicit, which offers convincing evidence for Gaussian Heuristic. 
3.1.1. Proof of Main Theorem 
Recall that t = −y + 1 2 1 n where y ∈ Z n is an arbitrary solution to Ax = s and e ∈ {0, 1} n is a small solution to Ax = s .
Then we can derive that dist (t , A ⊥ ) = 
√ 
n 
2 . Also we notice that e − y is the unique closest vector of A ⊥ to t if k ≥d , following
Theorem 1 in [25] . 
We note that the lattice A ⊥ is quite sparse. For random A ∼U ([ B ] k ×n ), it follows that 
Pr [ λ1 (A 
⊥ ) ≥ R ] = 1 − Pr [ λ1 (A ⊥ ) < R ] ≥ 1 −
∑ 
0 < ‖ z ‖ <R 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ ] . 
Since the cardinality of { x ∈ Z n | ‖ x ‖ ≤ √ n } is less than e 1.4189 n [21] , by Lemma 3.3 , we know that, when k ≥3 d , 
∑ 
0 < ‖ z ‖≤√ n 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ ] ≤ 1 
B k 
· 2 2 . 047 n ≤ 2 −0 . 9 n . 
Thus, with 3 d instances, the solution e can be recovered with overwhelming probability via a single call to BDD 1/2 . However,
BDD 1/2 is hard that cannot be solved in polynomial time so far. 
Indeed for some parameters, the BDD 1/2 oracle can be replaced by BDD 1/ γ with a large γ . Now we are to discuss
Pr [ λ1 (A 
⊥ ) ≥ R ] for R > √ n . 
We denote by S ( t, c ) the set 
S(t, c) = { z = (z 1 , · · · , z n ) ∈ Z n | ‖ z ‖ = t, gcd (z 1 , · · · , z n ) = c } . (3)
With Lemma 3.5 and the observation that S(t, c) = cS(t/c, 1) , it can be derived that when √ n < R ≤ B/n 2 , 
∑ 
0 < ‖ z ‖ <R 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ ] ≤ 3 
B k 
R 2 −1 ∑ 
j=1 
∑ 
c 2 | j 
∑ 
z ∈ S( 
√ 
j ,c) 
(
c 
‖ z ‖ ∞ 
)k 
= 3 
B k 
R 2 −1 ∑ 
l=1 
∑ 
0 <lc 2 <R 2 
∑ 
z ∈ S( 
√ 
l , 1) 
1 
‖ z ‖ k ∞ . 
Due to the fact that the number of c ’s such that 0 < lc 2 < R 2 is at most R/ 
√ 
l , and ‖ z ‖ ∞ ≥ ‖ z ‖ / √ n , we have ∑ 
0 < ‖ z ‖ <R 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ ] 
≤ 3 
B k 
R 2 −1 ∑ 
l=1 
R √ 
l 
∑ 
z ∈ S( 
√ 
l , 1) 
1 
‖ z ‖ k ∞ 
≤ 3 R 
B k 
⎛ 
⎝ n ∑ 
l=1 
| S( 
√ 
l , 1) | · 1 + 
R 2 −1 ∑ 
l= n +1 
| S( 
√ 
l , 1) | · 1 √ 
l 
·
( √ 
n 
l 
) k ⎞ ⎠ . 
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 We notice that 
∑ n 
l=1 | S( 
√ 
l , 1) | ≤ 2 2 . 047 n according to [21] . It is also noted that for l ≥n , S( √ l , 1) is the set of primitive
integer solutions to 
∑ n 
i =1 x 
2 
i 
= l, which implies that | S( √ l , 1) | ≤ r n (l) ≤ Cl n 2 −1 by Lemma 3.6 . Combining the fact that 
R 2 −1 ∑ 
j= n +1 
j 
n −k −3 
2 ≤
R 2 −1 ∑ 
j= n +1 
∫ j+1 
j 
x 
n −k −3 
2 dx ≤ 2(R 
n −k −1 − n n −k −1 2 ) 
n − k − 1 , 
it follows that if R = γ ·
√ 
n 
2 , then 
R 2 −1 ∑ 
l= n +1 
| S( 
√ 
l , 1) | · 1 √ 
l 
·
( √ 
n 
l 
) k 
≤ C( √ n ) k 
R 2 −1 ∑ 
l= n +1 
l 
n −k −1 
2 −1 
≤ 2 C( 
√ 
n ) n −1 
n − k − 1 
((
γ
2 
)n −k −1 
− 1 
)
. 
Finally, when 
√ 
n < R = γ ·
√ 
n 
2 < 
B 
n 2 
, we obtain that 
∑ 
0 < ‖ z ‖ <R 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ ] ≤ 3 γ
√ 
n · 2 2 . 047 n 
2 B k 
+ 
6 C( 
√ 
n ) n 
(
γ n −k − 2 n −k 
)
(n − k − 1) · 2 n −k · B k . 
When 1 2 d log n + 1 ≤ k ≤ n 3 and log γ ≤ n n −k 
(
k −1 
d 
− 1 2 log n 
)
+ 1 , we have 
∑ 
0 < ‖ z ‖ <R 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ ] ≤ 3 · 2 
3 . 047 n 
√ 
n 
2 0 . 5 n log n 
+ 6 C 
(n − k − 1) B 
which is negligible since B ≥ 2 log 2 n . 
Therefore, when 1 2 d log n + 1 ≤ k ≤ n 3 , it holds that λ1 (A ⊥ ) ≥ γ
√ 
n 
2 with overwhelming probability for 
1 ≤ log γ ≤ n 
n − k 
(
k − 1 
d 
− 1 
2 
log n 
)
+ 1 . 

Remark 2. The inequality in Theorem 3.1 shows a trade-off between the power of BDD oracle and the size k of the multi-
dimensional subset sum problem. As k increases, γ can reach a larger value, which means we can recover the solution by
solving a weaker BDD instance. 
According to the extended experiments in [13] , the practical limits of γ are 0.25 ×1.021 n by LLL and 0.48 ×1.012 n by
BKZ-20. Thus we can recover a solution in {0, 1} n to Ax = s with less than 0 . 03 n +0 . 5 log n 
0 . 03+1 /d challenges via LLL, or less than
0 . 017 n +0 . 5 log n 
0 . 017+1 /d challenges via BKZ-20. We note that the lattice A 
⊥ is of rank n − k . 
Overall, the relation of our reduction in Theorem 3.1 is much more accurate due to the improvement in Lemma 3.4 and
should be considered when setting parameters for cryptographic constructions based on subset sum problems. 
3.2. Broadcast attacks and analysis 
In this section, we describe a broadcast attack based on Theorem 3.1 . Given k challenges Ax = s where x ∈ {0, 1} n , we
compute a basis B of A ⊥ following the method in [24] and a target vector t = −y + 1 2 1 n where y is an arbitrary solution to
Ax = s . We will use lattice basis reduction algorithms (LLL and BKZ) to solve uSVP of the lattice ( B | t ). Similarly, one may
apply some other algorithms to solve the BDD instance ( B, t ) directly. 
3.2.1. Experimental method and performance 
We next report on our experimental results on the broadcast attack. We ran experiments on subset sum instances of
various density d and dimension n . For each instance, we measured the minimal k such that the solution can be recovered
from k challenges. In our experiments, we added a new challenge if the existing challenges were not enough to recover the
solution, which is more appropriate to the situation in real world. 
To begin with, we introduce a faster method of computing a basis of orthogonal lattice when new challenge is added.
Given a basis B of A ⊥ and a new challenge ( a , s ), we can easily compute U as the basis of (a T B ) ⊥ . It is easy to verify that BU
is a basis of the new lattice 
(
A 
a T 
)⊥ 
. We followed the method proposed in [24] but with a smaller scaling factor to obtain a
basis of orthogonal lattice. 
For each pair ( d, n ), we worked on 10 sets of random instances and evaluated the average of the minimal k such that the
broadcast attack succeeded with k challenges. We applied LLL algorithm with Lovász parameter 0.9999 and BKZ algorithm
with blocksize 20. Fig. 1 shows our practical broadcast attacks against subset sum problems for different parameters. 
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Fig. 1. Experimental results of our broadcast attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For the case of low density ( d = 1 , 2 ), it suffices to recover the solution from a small number of challenges using our
attack. When d is a monotonically increasing function of n (say d = log n ), the number of required challenges seems large,
but still within the range of fault tolerance in some consensus protocols [8] . Therefore, our attack is quite practical. Further-
more, the performance of our broadcast attack is heavily affected by the lattice basis reduction algorithm. Exploiting more
advanced algorithms such as BKZ 2.0 [10] , we may achieve higher dimensions with less challenges. 
3.2.2. Comparison with other broadcast attacks 
In this subsection, we compare our attack with two existing broadcast attacks proposed in [27,29] from the aspect of the
lattice problems that the subset sum problem was reduced to. 
Plantard-Susilo’s broadcast attack. In [29] , Plantard and Susilo proposed a broadcast attack against GGH and knapsack prob-
lem by intersecting the following lattices of dimension n + 2 and rank n + 1 for i = 1 , · · · , k 
L i = L 
(
I n 0 n a i 
1 
2 
1 T n 1 s i 
)T 
. 
They observed that once these L i ’s share a same nonzero shortest vector ( e , 0), their intersection lattice L ′ = 
⋂ L i would be
of a much larger gap, i.e. 
λ2 (L ′ ) 
λ1 (L ′ ) 
≥ max 
i 
{
λ2 (L i ) 
λ1 (L i ) 
}
. 
That is why they can recover e with a uSVP oracle to the lattice L ′ . 
Pan-Zhang’s broadcast attack. The Pan-Zhang’s attack [27] against multi-subset sum problem reduced the problem to an SVP
instance 
L ′′ = L 
(
I n 0 n NA 
T 
1 
2 
1 T n 1 Ns 
T 
)T 
, 
where N is a large integer. It is noted that L ′′ is of dimension n + k + 1 and rank n + 1 . They proved that when k ≥0.9408 d ,
the multi-subset sum problem can be solved by a single call to SVP algorithm on L ′′ . 
Recall that we reduce the subset sum problem to BDD instance (L (B ) , t ) where B is a basis of A ⊥ and t = −y + 1 2 1 n
for arbitrary y ∈ Z n such that Ay = s . In order to explicitly compare our attack with above attacks, we transform our BDD
instance to a uSVP instance 
L = L 
(
B t 
0 T 
n −k 1 
)
, 
which is of dimension n + 1 and rank n − k + 1 . 
We claim that L is sparser than L ′ and L ′′ . Indeed, our lattice L is a sublattice of both L ′ and L ′′ . More precisely, it holds
that (L , 0) T ⊆ L ′ and (L , 0 T 
k 
) T ⊆ L ′′ . For any (u T 1 , u 2 ) T ∈ Z n × Z and i ∈ [ k ] {0}, we have [ 
B t 
0 T 
n −k 1 
0 T 
n −k 0 
] [
u 1 
u 2 
]
= 
[ 
Bu 1 − u 2 y + 1 2 u 2 1 n 
u 2 
0 
] 
= 
[ 
I n 
1 
2 
1 n 
0 T n 1 
a T s i 
] [
Bu 1 − u 2 y 
u 2 
]
∈ L i , i 
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Table 1 
Comparison with other attacks. 
Oracle Lattice size Required k 
Plantard-Susilo uSVP (n + 2) × (n + 1) –
Pan-Zhang SVP (n + k + 1) × (n + 1) k ≥0.9408 d 
Our work BDD n × (n − k ) k ≥3 d 
uSVP (n + 1) × (n − k + 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 which implies that 
(L 
0 
)
⊆ L ′ = ⋂ i L i . Meanwhile, it can be proved that (L 0 k 
)
⊆ L ′′ because 
[ 
Bu 1 + u 2 t 
u 2 
0 k 
] 
= 
[ 
I n 
1 
2 
1 n 
0 T n 1 
NA T 
i 
Ns 
] [
Bu 1 − u 2 y 
u 2 
]
∈ L ′′ . 
These three attacks success only when (e T − 1 2 1 T n , −1 , 0 T ) T (the dimension of 0 depends on the dimension of lattice) is
the shortest vector of L , L ′ and L ′′ . Together with the above comparison that L is a sublattice of both L ′ and L ′′ , the λ2 -gap
of L is no less than L ′ and L ′′ , which means that solving uSVP on L is easier (at least not harder) than that on L ′ and L ′′ . 
Pan-Zhang’s attack can successfully recover the solution when k > 0.9408 d , while ours requires k to be larger. However,
Pan-Zhang’s attack relies on an SVP algorithm which is stronger than BDD or uSVP algorithm in general. 
We list the difference of these three attacks in Table 1 . 
3.3. Defense mechanisms against broadcast attacks 
Broadcast attacks apply to the scenario that a same plaintext is encrypted under several public keys. Notice that the
efficiency of the broadcast attack is closely related to the number of samples. Theorem 3.1 shows that the more instances
the attacker obtains, the easier it is to recover the plaintext. Thus restricting the number of recipients receiving the same
plaintext (the parameter k ) may be a feasible method to defense broadcast attack. 
Also, the reusage of a plaintext would lead to insecurity, since the ciphertexts can leak the information about the plain-
text in multiple encryptions. An effectual approach would be embedding some nonce into the message in encryption algo-
rithm. 
4. Applications to low-weight subset sum problems 
In this section, we will discuss the case of low-weight subset sum problems particularly. Low-weight subset sum prob-
lems have been used as the foundations of some known cryptographic schemes including Chor–Rivest cryptosystem [11] and
Okamoto–Tanaka–Uchiyama(OTU) cryptosystem [26] . Our attacks is applicable to average-case low-weight subset sum prob-
lems with certain parameters. 
A low-weight subset sum problem is to find a “small” solution to 
a 1 x 2 + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a n x n = s, 
where a i ’s are uniformly selected from [ B ] and 
∑ n 
i =1 x i = m . Usually, we set that B ≥n m and m ≤ n log n . There are two kinds
of encodings 
• Binary encoding: x ∈ {0, 1} n , ∑ n i =1 x i = m ; 
• Powerline encoding: x ∈ N n , ∑ n i =1 x i = m . 
Using our broadcast attack, we can recover the small solution e ′ of low-weight subset sum problems from k challenges, {
Ae ′ = s 
〈 e ′ , 1 n 〉 = m , 
where A ∼U ([ B ] k ×n ) for B ≥n m and m ≤ n 
log n 
. We denote by A ′ the matrix 
(1 T n 
A 
)
, by s ′ the matrix 
(m 
s 
)
and by y ′ a solution
to A ′ x = s ′ . 
For the binary encoding, we set the target vector t ′ = y ′ − 1 2 1 n and reduce the low-weight subset sum problem to a BDD
instance ( A ′ ⊥ , t ′ ) (or corresponding uSVP). For powerline encoding, we reduce it to BDD instance ( A ′ ⊥ , y ′ ) (or corresponding
uSVP) directly. 
We ran experiments using LLL algorithm with Lovász parameter 0.9999. The dimension n ranges from 40 to 300 by step
20. As explained in [25] , two cases where m = O 
(
n 
log n 
)
and m = 2 log c n for c < 1 are worth studying. In our experiments,
we set m = n 
2 log n 
and m = 2 log 0 . 75 n with B = n m respectively as a moderate choice, and considered these two cases for both
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Fig. 2. Practical performance for low-weight subset sum problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 binary and powerline encodings. For each pair ( n, m ), we tested 10 sets of random instances and evaluated the average of
the minimal k such that our attack succeeded with k challenges. 
As shown in Fig. 2 , we only require a small number of challenges to recover the solution, which shows the power of our
broadcast attack for low-weight subset sum problem. Moreover, it seems that the number of required challenges increases
with growing m , which provides a new evidence to support the rationality of replacing usual density ( d = n 
log B 
) with pseudo-
density for low-weight subset sum problem claimed in [25] . However, we note that the pseudo-density d = r log n 
log B 
, where r
is an upper bound of ‖ e ′ ‖ 2 , could not be viewed as the only criterion since in our experiments, these cases of different m ’s
for binary decoding have equal pseudo-densities but diverse hardness. 
5. Discussion on modular subset sum problems 
In this section, we are to discuss the broadcast attack against modular subset sum problem, which is quite different from
original subset sum problem. Given k challenges of modular subset sum problems ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
a 1 , 1 x 1 + a 1 , 2 x 2 + · · · + a 1 ,n x n = s 1 mod q 
a 2 , 1 x 1 + a 2 , 2 x 2 + · · · + a 2 ,n x n = s 2 mod q 
· · ·
a k, 1 x 1 + a k, 2 x 2 + · · · + a k,n x n = s k mod q 
where a i, j ∼ U(Z q ) for q > 0 and i ∈ [ k ] {0}, j ∈ [ n ] {0}. Let A q = (a i, j ) ∈ Z k ×n q and s = (s 1 , · · · , s k ) . The goal is to find a solution
e ∈ {0, 1} n to the equation A q x = s mod q . Similarly, we can define the lattice 
A ⊥ q = { z ∈ Z n | A q z = 0 mod q } . 
We will reduce the multi-dimensional modular subset sum problem A q x = s mod q to BDD instance (A ⊥ q , y q − 1 2 1 n ) where
y q is arbitrary solution to A q x = s mod q . To this end, we are to take a further study on the lattice A ⊥ q . 
Lemma 5.1. Given z = (z 1 , · · · , z n ) ∈ Z n \ { 0 } , we have that 
Pr [ z ∈ A ⊥ q ] = 
(
c 
q 
)k 
, 
where A q ∼ U(Z k ×n q ) and c = gcd (q, z 1 , · · · , z n ) . 
Proof. We note that given z = (z 1 , · · · , z n ) ∈ Z n \ { 0 } and c = gcd (q, z 1 , · · · , z n ) , the following holds on the randomness of
a i , 
Pr 
a i ∼U(Z q ) 
[ 
n ∑ 
i =1 
a i z i = 0 mod q 
] 
= Pr 
a i ∼U(Z q ) 
[ 
n ∑ 
i =1 
a i 
z i 
c 
= 0 mod q 
c 
] 
. 
Let q ′ = q/c and z ′ = z /c. Using Eq. (2) , we may obtain that 
Pr 
a i ∼U(Z q ) 
[ 
n ∑ 
i =1 
a i z 
′ 
i = 0 mod q ′ 
] 
= 1 
q ′ · q ′ n 
⎛ 
⎝ ∑ 
x ∈ Z n 
q ′ 
q ′ −1 ∑ 
λ=0 
α(λ〈 x , z ′ 〉 ) 
⎞ 
⎠ = 1 
q ′ . 
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 Since the rows of A q are independent, we complete the proof immediately. 
The following result shows a reduction from multi-dimensional modular subset sum problem to BDD. 
Theorem 5.2. There exists an algorithm to find a solution to A q x = s mod q for x ∈ {0, 1} n with probability 1 − O ( 1 n ) via a single
call to BDD 1/ γ oracle for 
0 < log γ ≤ k 
d 
− 1 
2 
log n + 1 
where k ≥ 1 2 d log n, A q is uniformly distributed over Z k ×n q and d = n log q is the density. 
Proof. Let y q ∈ Z n be arbitrary solution to A q x = s and t q = y q − 1 2 1 n . We reduce the multi-dimensional modular subset sum
problem to the BDD instance (A ⊥ q , t q ) . It is easy to verify that dist (A ⊥ q , t q ) = 
√ 
n 
2 . Then we will study the first minimum of
lattice A ⊥ q . 
We define σk (q, r) = 
∑ 
c| q,c≤r c k , then for R < q we have 
Pr [ λ1 (A 
⊥ 
q ) ≤ R ] ≤
∑ 
c≤R 
c| q 
(
c 
q 
)k  R 2 /c 2  ∑ 
l=1 
| S(c 
√ 
l , c) | = 1 
q k 
R 2 ∑ 
j=1 
| S( √ j , 1) | σk 
( 
q, 
R √ 
j 
) 
, 
where S ( r, c ) is defined as Eq. (3) . There exists a trivial bound for σ k ( q, r ): σk (q, r) ≤
∑  r 
i =1 i 
k ≤ r k +1 . Thus, by Lemma 3.6 , we
can obtain that 
Pr [ λ1 (A 
⊥ 
q ≤ R )] ≤
C 
q k 
R 2 ∑ 
l=1 
l 
n 
2 −1 
(
R √ 
l 
)k +1 
≤ CR 
k +1 
q k 
R 2 ∑ 
l=1 
l 
n −k −1 
2 −1 , 
where C is given in Lemma 3.6 . When R ≥
√ 
n 
2 , it follows that 
R 2 ∑ 
l=1 
l 
n −k −1 
2 −1 ≤ 2 
n − k − 1 (R 
2 + 1) n −k −1 2 ≤ 18 
n − k − 1 R 
n −k −1 . 
Hence when log R ≤ k n log q ≤ k d , we derive that 
Pr [ λ1 (A 
⊥ 
q ) ≤ R ] ≤
18 CR n 
(n − k − 1) q k ≤
18 C 
n − k − 1 . 
Therefore, when 0 ≤ log γ ≤ k 
d 
− 1 2 log n + 1 , each call to BDD 1/ γ oracle may succeed in solving the multi-dimensional
modular subset sum problem with probability ≥ 1 − O ( 1 n ) . 
Remark 3. The above result shows a reduction from ISIS (Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution) to BDD. From another
aspect, in a celebrated paper [2] , the author gave a worst-case to average-case reduction from SIVP (Shortest Independent
Vectors Problem) to SIS. Actually, this does not lead to a direct reduction from SIVP to BDD, because the dimension with
respect to SIVP is k but that with respect to BDD is n under similar parameters, i.e. n = (k log q ) . 
6. Conclusion and future work 
We propose a reduction from multi-dimensional subset sum problem to BDD and a practical broadcast attack based on
it. Moreover, we apply our method to low-weight subset sum problem and experimentally verify that our attack is quite
efficient for suggested parameters. 
Our results show some connections among lattice problems of worst-case hardness. It would be interesting to optimize
the reduction parameter further. All discussions in this paper focus on generic subset sum problem, thus we leave it as
future work to give a detailed cryptanalysis and determine the security parameter of concrete cryptosystems based on our
attack. Furthermore, some results may be of independent interest and applicable to general subset sum problems where the
solutions are not restricted to {0, 1} n . 
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